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Critical Theory and the 
Pragmatist Challengel 
Dmitri N. Shalin 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Habermas's theory breaks with the Continental tradition that has 
denigrated pragmatism as an Anglo-Saxon philosophy subservient 
to technocratic capitalism. While Habermas deftly uses pragmatist 
insights into communicative rationality and democratic ethos, he 
shows little sensitivity to other facets of pragmatism. This article 
argues that incorporating the pragmatist perspective on experience 
and indeterminacy brings a corrective to the emancipatory agenda 
championed by critical theorists. The pragmatist alternative to the 
theory of communicative action is presented, with the discussion 
centering around the following themes: disembodied reason versus 
embodied reasonableness, determinate being versus indeterminate 
reality, discursive truth versus pragmatic certainty, rational consen- 
sus versus reasonable dissent, transcendental democracy versus 
democratic transcendence, and rational society versus sane com- 
munity. 
For much of the 20th century, pragmatism was perceived in Europe as 
a crude expression of Anglo-Saxon utilitarianism. Even thinkers sympa- 
thetic to the new American current found it inferior to the Continental 
philosophical tradition. Less charitable critics, such as the writers close 
to the critical theory circle, dismissed pragmatism as instrumental reason 
run amok, a technocratic decisionism severed from substantive-rational 
moorings. It was not until the 1960s that respectable European thinkers 
began to pay more favorable attention to pragmatism and its sociological 
counterpart, symbolic interactionism. A notable example is Jiirgen Ha- 
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bermas, who recently admitted, "I have for a long time identified myself 
with that radical democratic mentality which is present in the best Ameri- 
can traditions and articulated in American pragmatism" (Habermas 
1985, p. 198). This statement is noteworthy not only because it holds 
fresh promise for a transatlantic dialogue, but also because it points to 
critical thinkers' renewed interest in liberal democracy and its emancipa- 
tory potential. 
While the search for common ground will be welcomed on this side of 
the Atlantic, it will also raise some eyebrows. There are many points on 
which critical theorists and writers steeped in pragmatism appear to part 
company. The former have a penchant for totalities, are conversant with 
rationality at large, and have profound reservations about bourgeois de- 
mocracy, whereas the latter attend to the particular, revel in multiple 
rationalities, and place much stock in democratic institutions. So, when 
Habermas (1986, p. 193) describes pragmatism as "a missing branch of 
Young Hegelianism," he is sure to make some critics wonder if his Euro- 
pean biases blinded him to pragmatism's native roots. 
I see nothing objectionable in the efforts to trace pragmatism's Euro- 
pean lineage. Nor do I agree with those who think Habermas has gotten 
pragmatism all wrong. A movement as diverse as this lends itself to 
more than one reading, and Habermas does an important service by 
illuminating its various facets-most notably its political dimension- 
which American sociologists claiming the pragmatist legacy tend to ig- 
nore. Still, I want to take issue with Habermas because something is 
amiss in his analysis-the pragmatist sensitivity to indeterminacy, con- 
tingency, and chaos. This sensitivity is remarkably in tune with trends 
in modern science, and it deserves far closer attention from sociologists 
than it has been granted so far. It is my contention that taking objective 
indeterminacy seriously would require rethinking central conclusions in 
Habermas's theory of communicative action. In particular, I would like 
to show that Habermas elevated verbal intellect at the expense of noncog- 
nitive intelligence and thereby truncated the pragmatist notion of experi- 
ence. I will also argue that incorporating the pragmatist perspective on 
democracy brings an important corrective to the emancipatory agenda 
championed by critical theorists. 
Critical theory and Habermas have received a fair amount of attention 
(Jay 1973; Rose 1978; McCarthy 1978; Held 1980; Geuss 1981; Kellner 
1985; Thompson and Held 1982; Antonio 1983; Bernstein and Forester 
1985; Ferrara 1985; Benhabib 1987; Wolin 1987). Aside from Antonio 
(1989), however, few authors explored in depth the interfaces between 
pragmatism, democracy, and Habermas's thought, and none, to my 
knowledge, incorporated the pragmatist perspective on experience and 
explored its implications for Habermas's views. My discussion centers 
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on the theory of communicative actions-a segment in Habermas's total 
corpus in which he joins issues with pragmatism and makes a concerted 
effort to incorporate its democratic ethos into the quintessentially Euro- 
pean project of critical theory. I begin with the sources of critical theo- 
rists' ambivalence toward democracy. Next, I examine how Habermas 
merged the pragmatist and critical theory traditions. And finally, I sub- 
ject his construction to criticism, using the pragmatist notions of experi- 
ence, indeterminacy, and democracy as analytical tools. 
FROM CRITICAL IDEALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 
It was not until Kant ([1781] 1966, p. xxiv) declared, "Our age is, in 
every sense of the word, the age of criticism, and everything must submit 
to it," that the term "critical" entered the philosophical lexicon in its 
modern sense. Kant chose his nomenclature deliberately to highlight the 
difference between the age of reason and the age of criticism, between 
overconfident rationalism of philosophes and "my transcendental or, bet- 
ter, critical idealism" (Kant [1783] 1950, p. 41). According to Kant, 
reason could no longer derive its mandate from divine inspiration or 
natural law but must lay its own standards for judging the true, the 
good, and the beautiful. For reason is not an outside observer impartially 
stating the truth and legislating a better future but a participant-observer 
whose rational activity gives the world its meaning and whose very unre- 
flexivity breeds oppression. The objective structures one finds in the 
world, physical or social, are grounded in the a priori structures of the 
mind itself. To change the former, the subject has to grasp the latter. In 
other words, emancipation starts with self-reflection; only after reason 
has exposed its own prejudices and learned its own limits can it proceed 
with its appointed task. Hence, the endless exhortations by Kant's suc- 
cessors to do away with "the dogmatic tendency in man" (Fichte [1794] 
1970, p. 161) and "dogmatism as a way of thinking" (Hegel [1807] 1967, 
p. 99) and get on with "a strenuous reacquisition of everything which 
has once been acquired" (Schelling [1800] 1978, p. 1). 
These utterings sound vaguely subversive, but in the postrevolutionary 
climate of early 19th-century Europe they had a distinctly conservative 
ring to them. Anxious to avoid the bloody excesses of the French Revolu- 
tion, critical idealists hastened to assure the world that the project of 
modernity they inherited from the Enlightenment would be carried out 
by peaceful means. The only force they were willing to tolerate was the 
force of reason itself-reason firmly grounded in principles, conscious 
of its moral moorings, and committed to the public good. This is what 
post-Kantian idealists called Vernunft and what they juxtaposed to Ver- 
stand, or everyday understanding, that, unbeknownst to itself, weaves 
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the familiar world from its biases, preconceptions, and particularistic 
interests. Viewed from this angle, the battle for emancipation is but "the 
battle of reason . . . to break the rigidity to which understanding has 
reduced everything" (Hegel [1817] 1975, p. 53). 
Vernunft is bound to strike some readers as an oversoul or a superhu- 
man agency, but there is nothing especially mysterious about it. While 
the telos of reason is humanity as a whole, its locus operandi is the 
individual who speaks on behalf of reason. Society is fully rational when 
its members heed the claims of reason they have raised, when they act 
their conscience and submit to a tribunal within which one is simulta- 
neously a defendant and a judge: "The consciousness of an inner tribunal 
in man . . . is conscience. . . . This original intellectual and . . . moral 
capacity, called conscience, has this peculiarity, that although its busi- 
ness is a business of a man with himself, he is obliged by his reason to 
look upon it as carried on at the command of another person. For the 
transaction is here the conduct of a law-case . . . before a judge" (Kant 
[1803] 1904, p. 289). 
The spirit of this statement is remarkably modern and democratic; it 
implies that every individual, regardless of origin or status, is a rational 
being and a potential agent of emancipation whose dormant capacity for 
criticism can be roused by the critical idealists' path-breaking intellec- 
tions. Emancipation through reason transpires here as a project that 
humans qua rational beings accomplish by subjecting to critical analysis 
the a priori grounds for their conduct, freeing themselves from preju- 
dices, and unswervingly following standards they have justified to them- 
selves as universal, equitable, and humane. 
The project of emancipation through reason came under attack during 
the reaction that followed the French Revolution, but its bourgeois demo- 
cratic ethos continued to nourish the moral imagination well into the 19th 
century. This ethos was still palpable in the young Marx, who called for 
"a ruthless criticism of everything existing" ([1843] 1972, p. 8) and urged 
the "reform of consciousness [which] consists solely in letting the world 
perceive its own consciousness by awakening it from dreaming about 
itself, in explaining to it its own actions" ([1843] 1971, p. 82). Marx's 
commitment to emancipation through criticism, however, wore thin in 
the revolutionary climate of the time. By the mid-1840s, he began to 
doubt the peaceable route to emancipation and, along with other young 
Hegelians, set out to investigate what keeps reason from exercising its 
curative powers. The main impediment, Marx concluded, was class dom- 
ination and the institutions, such as law, morality, and philosophy, 
through which the capitalist state obfuscates its oppression and perpetu- 
ates false consciousness among the toiling masses. The ruling class has 
the power to protect its particularistic interests, and it is naive to believe 
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that it would bow to the voice of universal reason and agree to yield 
its power peacefully. Bourgeois democracy is a sham; its much-touted 
freedoms stand in the path of emancipation, insofar as they legitimize 
exploitation and prevent workers from understanding their role as a driv- 
ing force in history. The real hope for emancipation lies with the concrete 
historical agent, the proletariat, a universal class for which criticism is 
not just a theoretical endeavor but a practical revolutionary deed. It is 
this class that can bring about communism-a society based on genuinely 
free discourse. Such a society frees consciousness from systematic ideolog- 
ical distortions, brings every rational individual into critical discourse, 
and thus for the first time makes reason truly universal and society fully 
rational. 
The dilemma Marx bequeathed to his successors-Must reason rely 
on democratic procedures or class violence to achieve its emancipatory 
objectives?-informs many debates about critical theory in the 20th cen- 
tury. Few participants in these debates failed to acknowledge that "the 
critical theory is the heir of . . . German idealism" (Horkheimer [1937] 
1976, p. 223). All agreed that critical theory aims at "the transformation 
of society [that] eliminates the original relationship between substructure 
and superstructure" (Marcuse [1937] 1968, p. 144; see also Marcuse 1960) 
and has as its ultimate goal "a society in which the 'people' have become 
autonomous individuals [freely] choosing their government and determin- 
ing their life" (Adorno 1965, p. 105). How exactly these goals were to 
be accomplished, however, remained a contentious issue. The fact that 
bourgeois democracy had failed to forestall fascism in Europe seriously 
undermined the trust in liberalism's emancipatory potential. The disillu- 
sionment ran especially deep among the writers gathered around Hork- 
heimer and the Frankfurt school, whose members sought to forge a con- 
ceptual link between totalitarianism and liberal rationalism. The 
impotence of bourgeois democracy is transparent in its surrender to totali- 
tarianism, the kind that the Third Reich exemplifies most vividly. In- 
deed, "we can say that liberalism 'produces' the total authoritarian state 
out of itself, as its own consummation at a more advanced stage of 
development" (Marcuse 1968a, p. 19). "The pattern of all administration 
and 'personnel policy,"' according to Adorno ([1951] 1978, p. 131), 
"tends of its own accord . . . towards Fascism." Horkheimer (1978, p. 
219) concurred with this diagnosis, charging that, left to its own devices, 
"democracy leads to its opposite-tyranny." 
Critical theorists were aware that the United States did not fit neatly 
into this scenario, yet they convinced themselves that America was rap- 
idly moving toward the "administered state," whose more subtle forms 
of domination bore equally ill tidings. The media-based domination they 
found in capitalist America looked every bit as pervasive, even if some- 
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what more benign, as the one achieved in a totalitarian state. The cul- 
tural industry of capitalism works over time to produce mass conscious- 
ness suitable for the market economy and amenable to social control. 
Marcuse's (1964) One-Dimensional Man is the best-known account of 
the bondage in which reason finds itself in a capitalist society, although 
the basic insights articulated in this book had been familiar to critical 
theorists for decades (Horkheimer and Adorno [1944] 1989, p. 222). 
While critical thinkers had few reasons to cheer European liberalism, 
they could not find much solace in the Marxist scenario either. For one 
thing, the proletarian masses failed to reveal themselves as the agents of 
historical emancipation Marx hailed them to be; rather, they displayed 
unmistakably conservative leanings and then precisely in the countries 
where "late capitalism" seemed to have reached its final stage. As the 
century unfolded, critical theorists also became painfully aware that the 
states claiming Marx's legacy had evolved their own totalitarianism, one 
that was equally inimical to critical theory's lofty ideals. Already in the 
1920s, critical thinkers questioned Marx's thesis about "the universal 
class" and spurned Lukac's apology for communist party domination. 
After World War II, their disaffection for Marxist states and Left totali- 
tarianism grew stronger (Neumann 1953, pp. 15-19; Marcuse 1958; 
Adorno [1966] 1973, p. 367; Horkheimer 1978, p. 230). Horkheimer ex- 
pressed this indignation with particular force, sparing neither "the ten- 
dency toward fascism in capitalist states" nor "a sudden turn of left- 
radical opposition into terrorist totalitarianism" (1978, pp. 230, 233). 
Marcuse was perhaps the only member of the original Frankfurt school 
willing to sanctify violence, to say that it was "a 'natural right' of resis- 
tance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use extralegal means" 
(1965, p. 116). But his views did not sit well with the old-generation 
critical thinkers, who refused to endorse left-wing terrorism and student 
militancy. This refusal precipitated the split within the New Left, with 
the younger generation opting for radical action and the older one left 
wallowing in doubt about critical theory's practical import. "There cer- 
tainly can be no true criticism without an intellectually grounded hope 
which derives its legitimacy from realistic possibilities," urged Hork- 
heimer (1978, p. 138). Yet with the liberal path toward emancipation 
blocked by the market-driven media and with class warfare discarded as 
a viable alternative, it was precisely "an intellectually grounded hope" 
that critical thinkers found in short supply. After the Second World War 
in particular it became obvious to many observers that "Critical Theory 
was now incapable of suggesting critical praxis" (Jay 1973, p. 279). It 
was in this climate of uncertainty about the prospects for emancipation 
that critical theorists proclaimed the eclipse of reason and embraced 
Weber's prophesies about rationalization's crippling effect on democracy. 
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What attracted Frankfurt school theorists to Weber was his unroman- 
tic view of reason as an agency whose power to control the world subverts 
human longing for meaningful life. This ironic capacity to render the 
world manageable and meaningless at the same time has been a central 
theme in emancipatory scholarship from the start. Already in his prize- 
winning Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Rousseau articulated the 
paradox of industry begetting poverty and culture breeding oppression. 
Critical idealists developed it further in their metaphysics of reason that 
remains estranged from itself and its products until it realizes its own 
responsibility for the world out there. Marx's theory, which blends the 
French Enlightenment and German idealism, offered another variation 
on this theme: history is the ongoing struggle of humanity to free itself 
from the dehumanizing consequences of its relentless drive to perfect the 
production forces-the drive that multiplies goods and miseries alike. 
These insights, minus the attendant optimism about reason's ultimate 
triumph, found their way into Weber's theory of global rationalization. 
Reason's power to assert control, to increase efficiency, to calculate 
the future-to achieve any proximate goal-is designated by Weber as 
"instrumental" or "formal rationality." The capacity to judge value, to 
realize a higher purpose, to pursue a just cause-to lead a meaningful 
life-is termed "value" or "substantive rationality" (Weber 1964, pp. 
184-86, 211-12). The relationship between the two is antinomian: the 
greater mastery reason achieves over the world of things and events, the 
less room is left for the questions of meaning and value; the more orga- 
nized reason becomes internally, the narrower the scope for personal 
choice; the farther the state extends its bureaucratic procedures, the heav- 
ier its domination over the individual. A telling example is representative 
democracy, which purports to express the people's will but in fact sub- 
verts its professed goal by virtue of its complexity, its pervasive legalism, 
and its growing dependence on party leaders, who inexorably come to 
dominate politics. Democracy, Weber (1964, pp. 407-23) concluded, is 
the most efficient form of domination, all the more pernicious that it 
conceals its totalitarian proclivities under the veneer of bureaucratic ra- 
tionality and popular rhetoric. The future of modernity is the "iron cage" 
that reason has unwittingly forged for itself and where it is destined to 
dwell-unfree, disenchanted, longing for meaning, unsure of its higher 
purpose (Weber [1904-5] 1958, p. 182).2 
It is easy to see how much Critique of Instrumental Reason, One-Di- 
mensional Man, or Negative Dialectics owes to this dark vision. Weber's 
unsentimental insights into the rationalization process and its unintended 
2 For further discussion of Weber's views on formal and substantive democracy see 
Giddens (1972), Mommsen (1974), and Cohen (1985). 
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systemic consequences have been absorbed into such critical-theoretic 
concepts as the "administered state," "totalitarian democracy," "expert 
cultures," "isolation through communication," and "media-distorted 
discourse." His disdain for formal democracy seems to have been borne 
out by actual historical developments in the capitalist West and the com- 
munist East. And his skepticism about the prospects for substantive de- 
mocracy neatly rationalized the Frankfurt school's failure to tie its theory 
to political practice. There was a penalty, of course, that critical theorists 
had to pay for embracing Weber-surrendering rational hope for emanci- 
pation. This was what "melancholy science," as Adorno dubbed critical 
theory, was coming to. And this was why Jiirgen Habermas found the 
Frankfurt school's confines too narrow and moved beyond its fold. He 
did it to take a fresh look at the question that the old-generation critical 
thinkers left unanswered: Is emancipation through reason a rational 
hope? Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action can be seen as an 
attempt to invigorate critical theory by merging the Continental and 
Anglo-Saxon traditions and bringing the pragmatist perspective to bear 
on the project of emancipation through reason. 
FROM CRITICAL THEORY TO COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
"It is only in Western nations that the precarious and continually threat- 
ened achievements of bourgeois emancipation and the worker's move- 
ment are guaranteed to any extent worth mentioning.... And we know 
just how important bourgeois freedoms are. For when things go wrong 
it is those on the Left who become the first victims" (Habermas 1986, 
p. 42). This intriguing observation illuminates a paradox: the very fact 
that the Institute for Social Research, the hotbed of critical thinking, has 
been thriving in capitalist West Germany seems to suggest that it serves 
the existing order. This contradiction has not been lost on the right- and 
left-wing critics, who alternatively charged the Frankfurt school leaders 
with ingratitude toward the existing order or betraying working-class 
interests. In their defense, critical theorists pointed to the marginal posi- 
tion they occupy in the academe, the media's power to blunt the critical 
message, and the false consciousness pervading capitalist society, yet 
these explanations are rather half-hearted, given the prominent positions 
that critical theorists acquired in German academia after World War II, 
and they certainly do not go to the heart of the matter. The real problem 
is that "the old Frankfurt School never took bourgeois democracy very 
seriously" (Habermas 1986, p. 98). By contrast, Habermas takes pains 
to emphasize that academic freedom is for real, that bourgeois democracy 
is a major historical accomplishment, and that its liberal institutions are 
indispensable for genuine criticism. All this by no means obviates the 
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fundamental criticism that critical theorists have leveled against the capi- 
talist order, most signally against "the pervasive inequality of freedom 
[and] unequal opportunity of access to the means of democratic persua- 
sion" (Marcuse [1968] 1976, p. 326). Habermas accepts the premise that 
the rationalization process has produced systemic consequences highly 
injurious to the democratic process: modern systems are unmanageably 
complex; a consumerist economy manufactures false needs; the mass me- 
dia manipulates public opinion; expert cultures obfuscate the public's 
stake in technical issues; and relentless bureaucratization robs humans 
of their autonomy, dignity, and solidarity (Habermas [1962] 1989, pp. 
141-222; [1981] 1987b, pp. 332-73). These are the familiar ills of late 
capitalism. Formidable though they are, they do not spell democracy's 
impending doom. The old-school critical theorists have grown unreason- 
ably pessimistic about the project of modernity, but their pessimism is 
historically unfounded and theoretically fallacious; the prospects for 
emancipation through reason "can today no longer be disqualified as 
simply utopian" (Habermas 1989, p. 235). The agenda for the day is "the 
reconciliation of a modernity which has fallen apart," the rededication to 
the idea "that without surrendering the differentiation that modernity 
has made possible in the cultural and economic spheres, one can find 
forms of living together in which autonomy and dependency can truly 
enter into a non-antagonistic relation, that one can walk tall in a collectiv- 
ity that does not have the dubious quality of backward-looking substan- 
tial forms of community" (Habermas 1986, p. 125). To salvage the proj- 
ect of modernity, critical theory must cure the democratic process of 
distortions it suffers in a capitalist society. How can this be done? Ha- 
bermas answers with a prescription borrowed from American pragma- 
tism: by mobilizing the public, revitalizing public discourse, and getting 
personally involved in politics. 
Habermas's willingness to join issues with pragmatism is very much 
at odds with the German tradition, in which the intellectual was "bred 
in the veneration of theory and history, and contempt for empiricism and 
pragmatism" (Neumann 1953, p. 19). Frankfurt school thinkers were 
solidly embedded in this tradition, their writings evincing little apprecia- 
tion for pragmatism's emancipatory potential (Marcuse 1939/1940; Hork- 
heimer 1937, 1947). They dismissed pragmatism in a wholesale fashion as 
"the abasement of reason" and "a genuine expression of the positivistic 
approach," a philosophy which advocates the "reduction of reason to a 
mere instrument" and serves as a "counterpart of modern industrialism, 
for which the factory is the prototype of human existence, and which 
models all branches of culture after production on the conveyor belt, 
or after the rationalized front office" (Horkheimer 1947, pp. 45-54). 
Habermas's break with this tradition was not instantaneous. According 
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to his own account (Habermas 1986, pp. 104, 151, 193), his interest in 
pragmatism goes back to the early 1960s, when Karl-Otto Apel encour- 
aged him to read Peirce and other pragmatists. Knowledge and Interest, 
published in Germany in 1968 (Habermas 1971; see also Habermas 1975), 
is the first work in which Habermas treats pragmatism systematically. 
There is no mention of Mead in this volume, Dewey is cited once or 
twice, but Peirce is treated at length as a representative pragmatist 
thinker. The treatment is more sympathetic than the one accorded by 
Marcuse and Horkheimer, but it does not break completely with the 
thesis, first advanced by Max Scheler ([1926] 1977), that pragmatism 
exemplifies a formal-rational preoccupation with nature that undermines 
the normative discourse embedded in substantive rationality. What Ha- 
bermas (1986, p. 193) finds appealing in Peirce is the "logical socialism" 
implicit in the latter's exalted view of a community of rational thinkers 
engaged in critical inquiry and ceaselessly advancing toward the truth 
through uncoerced discourse, rational argumentation, and consensus 
building. It was not until Habermas encountered Dewey and Mead, how- 
ever, that he fully realized the momentous implications that Peirce's ideas 
had for critical theory. 
"The radical-democratic branch of Young Hegelianism" is the term 
Habermas (1986, p. 151) coined to frame the pragmatism espoused by 
Dewey and Mead. This apt description highlights the often overlooked 
debt that pragmatist thinkers owe to German idealism, the ingenuous 
manner in which Peirce, Dewey, Mead, and to a lesser extent, William 
James developed a Hegelian concern with language, communication, and 
intersubjectivity-the social dimension of reason. Dewey's writings were 
particularly instrumental in sensitizing Habermas to the continuity be- 
tween scientific inquiry and democratic discourse, to the fact that "free- 
dom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication, 
the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate 
intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as in the scientific 
method" (Dewey 1939, p. 102). From the same source comes Habermas's 
appreciation for the public and its role in sustaining inquiry into commu- 
nal affairs. The prospect for democracy, Dewey contended and Ha- 
bermas agreed, "rests upon persuasion, upon ability to convince and be 
convinced," upon "the improvement of the methods and conditions of 
debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public" 
(Dewey 1916a, p. 134; 1939, p. 102). Taking the argument one step 
further, Dewey (1946, p. 132) comes up with an appeal that critical 
theorists would have appreciated, if not fully endorsed: "Humane liberal- 
ism in order to save itself must cease to deal with symptoms and go to 
the causes of which inequalities and oppressions are but the symptoms. 
In order to endure under present conditions, liberalism must become 
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radical in the sense that, instead of using social power to ameliorate the 
evil consequences of the existing system, it shall use social power to 
change the system." 
Mead caught Habermas's attention for some of the same reasons that 
Dewey did, but in addition to Mead's progressive democratic agenda, 
Habermas found in his writings a theory that "elevated symbolically 
mediated interaction to the new paradigm of reason" and that signified 
a major advance beyond the old "paradigm of the philosophy of con- 
sciousness" (Habermas 1984, p. 390). This point, crucial to Habermas's 
own project, deserves some elaboration. We can recall that critical ideal- 
ists placed much stock in the historical process that elevates biased, unre- 
flexive, everyday understanding (Verstand) to the loftier status of self- 
conscious reason that spearheads criticism and attends to higher truths 
(Vernunft). Habermas traces this trust in the noble faculties of reason to 
the tradition that stretches from Descartes, through German idealism, to 
critical theorists. The problem with this tradition, as Habermas sees it, 
is that it does not incorporate the sociological perspective on reason as a 
communicative affair; instead, it treats reason as a unitary phenomenon 
modeled after instrumental labor activity, as a process bound to the 
subject, who confronts the world all alone and single-handedly trans- 
forms it into a rational objective whole. Hegel's objective idealism did 
entail some tantalizing insights into the role that language and commu- 
nity play in the genesis of self-consciousness, but much of his work fol- 
lowed the old paradigm, and whatever sociologically relevant ideas he 
had presaged failed to take root on German soil.3 By contrast, American 
pragmatists seized exactly this neglected aspect of German idealism, ex- 
panding it into a new paradigm of reason as social through and through. 
Sidestepping the familiar pair of Verstand and Vernunft, the new para- 
digm gives prominence to Verstindigung, the interactive process of reach- 
ing understanding. "The change in perspective from solitary rational 
purposiveness to social interaction," writes Habermas (1987a, p. 149), 
"does promise to illuminate the very process of mutual understanding 
[Verstdndigung]-and not merely of understanding [Verstehen]." Mead, 
Habermas continues, resolutely renounced the paradigm of reason as 
solitary consciousness and went further than other contemporary scholars 
to lay out the paradigm of reason as communicative action and to spell 
out its implications for the emancipatory agenda, which is why Mead's 
3 Habermas may be underestimating the extent to which the social dimension of reason 
was elaborated in the German tradition in general and in transcendental idealism in 
particular. For an alternative view, see Royce (1919, p. 65), Mead (1936, p. 147), and 
Shalin (1986a, 1986b). 
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ideas must be included in any theory that assigns to self-consciousness 
and critique a role in social reconstruction. 
Indeed, Mead not only joins in the classical discourse on rationality 
and emancipation through reason-he also pushes it in a new direction. 
His discussion owes much to German idealism, which Mead studied as 
a student at Harvard and in Berlin and then taught for many years at 
the University of Chicago.4 His views on evolution as a process that 
brings nature to self-consciousness and assures humans "some degree of 
control of the process of evolution out of which they arose" (Mead 1938, 
p. 511) bring to mind Hegel's phenomenology, with its dialectics of rea- 
son that objectifies itself in nature, finds itself estranged from its own 
products, and then gradually rediscovers its authorship over the way 
things are. But Mead's approach is also thoroughly informed by the 
evolutionary perspective and the pragmatist determination to tie thinking 
to conduct. "What I have attempted to do," explains Mead (1934, p. 
334), "is to bring rationality back to a certain type of conduct, the type 
of conduct in which the individual puts himself in the attitude of the 
whole community to which he belongs. This implies that the whole group 
is involved in some organized activity and that in this organized activity 
the action of one calls for the action of the other organisms involved. 
What we term 'reason' arises when one of the organisms takes into its 
own response the attitude of the other organisms involved. . . When it 
does so, it is what we term 'a rational being."' Reason is historically 
embedded in communal existence; once brought into being, it transforms 
community life itself, for, according to Mead, "when the process of evo- 
lution has passed under the control of social reason" (1938, p. 508), it 
"becomes not only self-conscious but also self-critical" (1934, p. 255). 
From a central preoccupation with the mastery over things, reason now 
turns toward the questions of value. To use Weberian terminology, rea- 
son becomes substantive; that is, it reevaluates values, rationally resolves 
social conflicts, and endeavors to revamp the entire social order from 
which it sprang: 
The rational solution of the conflict, however, calls for the reconstruction 
of both habits and values, and this involves transcending the order of the 
community. A hypothetically different order suggests itself and becomes 
the end in conduct.... In logical terms there is established a universe of 
discourse which transcends the specific order within which the members 
of the community may, in a specific conflict, place themselves outside of 
the community order as it exists, and agree upon changed habits of action 
and a restatement of values. Rational procedure, therefore, sets up an order 
within which thought operates.... Its claims are the claims of reason. It 
4 See Joas (1985) and Shalin (1984, 1990) on the Mead-idealism connection. 
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is a social order that includes any rational being who is or may be in any 
way implicated in the situation. [Mead (1930) 1964, p. 404] 
A cursory look at Habermas's theory reveals the measure of his debt 
to pragmatism. We find in his work the same mixture of historical opti- 
mism that harks back to critical idealism and tough-minded realism 
found in Progressive Era pragmatism. The belief in "a noncoercively 
unifying, consensus building force of a discourse in which the participants 
overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favor of a rationally 
motivated agreement" (Habermas 1987a, p. 315) is combined here with 
a keen awareness that communications remain "systematically dis- 
torted" in a "money-bound," "media-steered" society that keeps public 
discourse from realizing its full critical potential (Habermas 1987b, pp. 
256-82). In spite of these instructive continuities, there are several issues 
on which Habermas and pragmatists part company. I shall come back 
to the pragmatist critique of Habermas in the next section; here I consider 
the points for which Habermas takes pragmatists to task. 
From the sociological standpoint, pragmatism's central contribution is 
to an "action-theoretic" framework. Symbolic interactionists have ex- 
plored at length the linguistically mediated interactions in which human 
identities are formed, and thereby they have expanded our understanding 
of the communicative foundations of life worlds. At the same time, 
pragmatism-inspired social theory has little to offer to "system-theoretic" 
approaches, Habermas insists. It ignores the normative underpinnings of 
society, its functional needs as a system, and it cannot satisfactorily ex- 
plain how communicative distortions and social oppression are generated 
and reproduced. Thus, Mead assumes the normative status for his notion 
of the "generalized other" without explaining where its power to control 
behavior comes from. Similarly, Dewey is too sanguine about democrati- 
zation's by-products-expert cultures and administrative procedures, 
which are as endemic to modern democracy as they are subversive of its 
substance. "We want democratization," Habermas (1986, p. 67) intones, 
"not so much in order to improve the efficiency of the economy as to 
change the structures of power: and in the second place to set in motion 
ways of defining collective goals that merely administrative procedures 
or power-oriented decisions would lead astray or cripple." 
It is arguable whether pragmatism lacks normative dimension, let 
alone whether it is inherently incapable of dealing with structural phe- 
nomena, but it is fair to say that system-theoretic issues have not been 
central to pragmatist analysis in the past. To offset this limitation of 
classical pragmatism, Habermas seeks to complement it with ideas from 
several other sources. From Weber, he borrows his insight into the differ- 
entiation of value spheres; from Durkheim, the notion of normative con- 
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straint; from Parsons and Luhmann, a version of systems theory. From 
Austin, Wittgenstein, and Searle, he appropriates the theory of speech 
acts, and from Kohlberg and Piaget, the genetic theory of moral growth. 
Combining these ideas with the Meadian theory of symbolic interaction, 
Habermas formulates his theory of communicative action (TCA), with 
its conceptual core-"universal pragmatics." Habermas uses the term 
"pragmatics" in a different sense than Peirce, who saw in it a branch 
of cosmology dealing with signs in their natural settings, or Charles Mor- 
ris, who used the term to designate a part of semiotics that explicates the 
relations between symbols and their users. The pragmatics that Ha- 
bermas has in mind is "universal"-it purports to unveil most general 
standards that govern rational communications in human discourse. 
Drawing on Weber's theory, Habermas isolates three basic forms of dis- 
course or value spheres that become progressively autonomous in the 
course of historical rationalization: theoretic/scientific, moral/practical, 
and expressive/aesthetic. Communications within each of these domains 
revolve around a peculiar validity claim: theoretic discourse concerns the 
truth of our propositions, practical discourse bears on the justice of our 
actions, and aesthetic discourse highlights the sincerity of our feelings. 
Although these validity claims are intertwined with scientific, moral, and 
artistic discourses, they are not bound exclusively to these specialized 
value spheres. In our everyday life, we routinely assert facts, appeal to 
norms, and claim to be sincere; that is, we raise and settle validity claims 
concerning truth, justice, and authenticity, and, by doing so, we continu- 
ously reproduce our normative, cultural, and private worlds. In the lan- 
guage of speech act theory, we "do things with words" via "performa- 
tive actions," which are linguistic facts just as they are social facts. Now, 
the crucial point Habermas makes is that the validity claims remain 
largely unthematized in everyday transactions, during which they are 
redeemed not so much by recourse to reasons and arguments as through 
strategic action and appeal to custom. It is the task of universal pragmat- 
ics to render these unreflexive validity claims problematic, to help settle 
them by rational means. Universal pragmatics articulates "a procedural 
concept of rationality," "a pragmatic logic of argumentation" (Haber- 
mas 1987a, p. 314), and promises to certify "the rationality of process of 
reaching understanding" (Habermas 1985, p. 196). Its main premise is 
that any communicative act aimed at reaching understanding contains 
implicit, context-free, and imminently social standards that must be met 
if its outcome is to be judged rational. The situation where such standards 
are fully met is called "ideal speech situation." 
Habermas does not provide a glossary of rules underlying the ideal 
speech situation. Nor does he offer any final formulation, as he continues 
to revise the theory he first outlined in the late 1960s (see, e.g., Habermas 
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1970, 1979). Still, I think these procedural rules or guidelines for achiev- 
ing communicative rationality can be codified as follows: 
1. An ideal speech situation provides every interested individual a chance 
to participate in discourse and argue one's viewpoint. 
2. It is free from coercion, domination, and power play-all purely in- 
strumental and strategic motifs. 
3. It differentiates cognitive, normative, and expressive validity claims 
implicit in our assertions and redeems them through arguments alone. 
4. It makes a freely reached consensus the sole foundation for democratic 
will formation and policy articulation. 
5. It leaves a rationally motivated agreement open to revision in light of 
further deliberations. 
The thing that strikes one immediately is how well these stipulations 
jibe with the critical idealists' belief in Vernunft as "the true tribunal for 
all disputes of reason [which] secures to us the peace of a legal status, in 
which disputes are not to be carried on except in the proper form of 
a lawsuit" (Kant 1966, p. 486). The continuity does not escape Haber- 
mas, who grounds his theory on the "principle, that-expressed in the 
Kantian manner-only reason should have force" (Habermas 1970, 
p. 7). At the same time, Habermas is quick to point out that his theory 
is not to be confused with transcendental idealism. Universal pragmatics 
presupposes certain standards for rationality and serves as a measuring 
rod for judging concrete communicative practices, yet its validity is not 
entirely a priori. Procedural standards for rationality spelled out in uni- 
versal pragmatics are counterfactual: "One should not imagine the ideal 
speech situation as a utopian model of an emancipated society" (Ha- 
bermas 1986, p. 90). Nor should an ideal speech situation be confused 
with an ideal type, for the latter professes ethical neutrality whereas the 
former is self-consciously normative and prescriptive. Universal prag- 
matics is the case of "reconstructive theory" (Habermas 1979, pp. 8-9, 
178-79); that is, theory whose normative thrust does not preclude empiri- 
cal validation, even if it can be achieved only indirectly. Taking his clues 
from Durkheim's writings on the sacred and Piaget-Kohlberg's research 
on moral growth, Habermas infers that the movement toward communi- 
cative rationality is both an evolutionary trend, evident in the shift from 
sacred to discursive practices, and an ontogenetic current, manifest in 
the gradual increase in the individual's capacity for moral reasoning. 
At the heart of modernity is the empirically observable drive toward 
rationalization, which gradually replaces "the weight of tradition with 
the weight of arguments, . . . an attitude of faith based on the authority 
of a doctrine with a theoretical attitude" (Habermas 1979, p. 113), and 
it is this relentless drive that pulls society away "from the sacred founda- 
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tions of legitimation to foundation on a common will, communicatively 
shaped and discursively clarified in the political public sphere" (Ha- 
bermas 1987b, p. 81). This shift, most apparent in the history of the 
Occidental world, can be gleaned from the gradual gain in human rights, 
the emergence of the independent judiciary, the separation of cognitive 
and power claims, the strengthening of voluntary associations, and simi- 
lar developments that mark the movement, however contradictory, to- 
ward communicatively rational forms of legitimation. 
Bureaucratization, juridification, mediatization, and such like systemic 
dysfunctions point to another, less benign facet of rationalization. Sub- 
jected to the capitalist market imperatives, these developments produce 
distortions that undermine communicative rationality and weaken public 
discourse. As each value sphere evolves according to its own logic, it 
becomes insular, impregnable to considerations from other value spheres: 
technical issues are separated from moral concerns; ethical demands are 
severed from expressive needs; personal agendas come into conflict with 
public ones. The mass media further exacerbates these trends by making 
a spectacle out of public discourse, turning it into an entertainment: 
"Discussion, now a 'business,' becomes formalized; the presentation of 
positions and counterpositions is bound to certain prearranged rules of 
the game; consensus about the public matter is made largely superflu- 
ous.... Critical debate arranged in this manner fulfills important social- 
psychological functions, especially that of a tranquilizing substitute for 
action" (Habermas 1989, p. 164). Now, it needs to be stressed that the 
problem for Habermas is not modernity and rationalization as such, but 
fractured modernity and one-sided rationalization, and the cure is break- 
ing the walls that separate value spheres without destroying an insight 
peculiar to each. The question, in other words, is how to "bring view- 
points of moral and aesthetic critique to bear-without threatening the 
primacy of questions of truth" (Habermas 1987b, p. 398). If this can be 
done at all, it is through public discourse, by painstakingly redeeming 
the validity claims implicit in our communications and following the rules 
of procedural rationality elucidated in the universal pragmatics. One 
hundred percent procedurally rational communications may be impossi- 
ble to achieve, but by opening up the legitimation process to all members 
of society and verbalizing norms previously immune to rational adjudica- 
tion, we, at the very least, assure movement in the right direction. Take 
the ideal speech situation seriously, Habermas advises, rid yourself of 
hidden agendas and avail yourself of procedurally rational discourse, 
and you help bring about an emancipated society, a democracy that is 
substantively rational. "The false alternative set up by Max Weber, with 
his opposition between substantive and formal rationality, is overcome" 
(Habermas 1987a, p. 315). 
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Most commentators agree that TCA constitutes an important advance, 
or certainly a new beginning, for critical theory. This advance has not 
come cheaply. In some respects, Habermas's theory was a step backward 
(e.g., Habermas does not show Adorno's sensitivity to the indeterminate 
and the irrational). In settling old issues, Habermas has raised new, 
sometimes even more vexing ones. Is reason genderless and classless? 
Does it have to shed its ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, and personal 
colors before it can do its critical job? How can theoretical, practical, 
and aesthetic discourses inform each other without losing their vital au- 
tonomy? What about contingency and indeterminacy thwarting our best 
plans and good faith efforts? Is the lack of rational consensus a sign that 
communicative action has failed? These are just some of the questions 
that TCA has stirred up and that have generated a voluminous litera- 
ture.5 I shall try not to repeat the more obvious criticisms voiced in the 
past, and, in keeping with my objectives, confine my comments to the 
issues on the interfaces of pragmatism, democracy, and critical theory. 
FROM COMMUNICATIVE ACTION TO PRAGMATIC POLITICS 
The ideal speech situation outlined in Habermas's universal pragmatics 
is more than a prescription for successful communication. Enciphered in 
its principles is a blueprint for a rational society-a society whose mem- 
bers make good sense, offer rationales for their action, mean what they 
say, and practice what they preach. This lofty image, which brings to 
mind the ancient quest for a way of life combining truth, justice, and 
happiness, has undeniable appeal. It is also flawed in several respects. 
My critique is sympathetic, for I share Habermas's humanistic agenda, 
yet it is principled because I question some of his fundamental premises. 
My discussion draws on the pragmatist ideas left out in Habermas's 
analysis, and it is organized around the following themes: disembodied 
reason versus embodied reasonableness, determinate being versus inde- 
terminate reality, discursive validity versus pragmatic certainty, rational 
consensus versus reasonable dissent, transcendental democracy versus 
democratic transcendence, and rational society versus sane community. 
It should be noted that I do not try to picture pragmatism as a monolithic 
movement free from internal contradictions and inconsistencies. How- 
ever, the present reconstruction centers on pragmatists' shared concerns, 
5 A wide range of critical comments on Habermas's corpus can be found in two 
representative collections: Habermas: Critical Debates, edited by Thompson and Held 
(1982), and Habermas and Modernity, edited by Bernstein (1985). For a more detailed 
discussion of Habermas's theory of communicative action see McCarthy (1978), Fer- 
rara (1985), Benhabib (1987), Antonio (1989), and a special issue of Symbolic Interac- 
tion (Shalin 1992). 
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and especially on their common stance against rationalism, the vestiges 
of which can be found in Habermas's thought.6 
Disembodied Reason versus Embodied Reasonableness 
My first objection concerns the place Habermas assigns to reason in 
relation to nature and human body. Reason appears in TCA primarily 
as thinking (consciousness, understanding, cognition). It has no obvious 
relation to the human body and noncognitive processes (emotions, feel- 
ings, sentiments). What pragmatists call "experience" has shriveled into 
verbal intellect, which assumes in TCA a privileged position as a locus 
of rationality. Communicative competence is predicated on reason's ca- 
pacity to be "relieved of the pressure of action and experience" (Haber- 
mas 1984, p. 25), to "transcend all limitations of space and time, all the 
provincial limitations of the given context" (Habermas 1987b, p. 399). 
Rational discourse, correlatively, deals in ideas, concepts, and reasons 
rather than in sentiments. The latter represent an inferior species of 
intelligence, in that they have limited generalizability, cannot be readily 
communicated, are inherently uncritical, and need to be edified by intel- 
lect. To the extent that noncognitive elements enter discourse, they have 
to be grasped conceptually and measured by theoretically grounded stan- 
dards, a process that certifies our emotive life as authentic and sincere. 
Affects that do not pass the test set up by reason are deemed "irrational" 
and subjected to "therapeutic critique," which helps the individual "free 
himself from illusions, and indeed from illusions that are based not on 
errors (about facts) but on self-deceptions (about one's own subjective 
experiences)" (Habermas 1984, p. 21). 
By contrast, pragmatists caution against the "hypostatization of cogni- 
tive behavior" (Rorty 1982, p. 201) and warn that consciousness "is only 
a very small and shifting portion of experience" (Dewey 1916b, p. 6). 
"Reason, anyway, is a faculty of secondary rank," Peirce (1976, p. xxi) 
remarks, "cognition is but the superficial film of the soul, while sentiment 
penetrates its substance." What is important for the pragmatist is that 
cognitive behavior belongs to a larger context of material practice, which 
philogenetically and ontogenetically antedates mind's conceptual faculty. 
Communication is contingent on minding something together, carrying 
out a larger act in which participants are engaged bodily as well as 
mentally. "Mental processes imply not only mind but that somebody is 
minding" (Mead 1938, p. 69). "The mother minds her baby; she cares 
6 Among contemporary works on pragmatism, I found particularly useful the follow- 
ing: Alexander (1987), Bernstein (1983), Coughlan (1975), Joas (1985), Kloppenberg 
(1986), Rockberg-Halton (1986), Rorty (1979, 1982), and Rosenthal (1986). 
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for it with affection. Mind is care in the sense of solicitude, anxiety, as 
well as of active looking after things that need to be tended" (Dewey 
[1934] 1958b, p. 263). Pragmatists refuse to isolate communicative actions 
from this larger context, from "the universe of nonreflectional experience 
of our doings, sufferings, enjoyments of the world and of one another" 
(Dewey 1916b, p. 9). Notice that the pragmatist maxim-knowing is 
doing-brooks no anti-intellectualism. Pragmatists do not deny the key 
role abstraction and generalization play in theoretical discourse, nor do 
they dispute that private interests and crude emotions can distort reason- 
ing. Nevertheless, pragmatists argue, the "conclusion is not that the 
emotional, passionate phase of action can be or should be eliminated 
in behalf of a bloodless reason. More 'passions,' not fewer, is the an- 
swer. . . . Rationality, once more is not a force to evoke against impulse 
and habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse 
desires" (Dewey [1922] 1950b, pp. 195-96). Pragmatists are quick to 
point out that "reasoning has no monopoly of the process of generaliza- 
tion," that "sentiment also generalizes itself" (Peirce 1976, p. xxi). Feel- 
ings can be universalized and communicated even more readily than 
ideas. We share attitudes before we share thoughts (Mead 1934), we 
sympathize before we understand (Benhabib 1987), we feel other people's 
pain before we know its source (Rorty 1989). Habermas shows little 
appreciation for such nondiscursive communication. He elevates the cog- 
nitive form of universality above all others and in the process inadver- 
tently devalues human experience as merely private and intellectually 
mute. This indifference to the nondiscursive element in culture, to the 
fact that just "as the body becomes 'encultured,' . . . so culture becomes 
'embodied"' (Alexander 1987, p. xix), is a vestige of rationalism and its 
notorious tendency to think in dichotomies, such as subject and object, 
reason and nature, sentiment and intellect, and so on. Pragmatists, on 
the other hand, are convinced that noncognitive prehensions have an 
intelligence all their own, which a radically theoretical attitude tends to 
ignore or, worse, suppress. Contrary to the rationalist view, reason has 
a lot to learn from noncognitive functions: feelings point to a crisis in 
experience, sentiments signal when general principles take a beating from 
obdurate reality, emotions provide a running commentary on the success 
of our plans. To divest reason from living experience is to disembody it, 
to leave it helpless in the face of the perennial indeterminacy and contin- 
gency with which humans have to struggle in their everyday existence. 
When thinking leaves experience far behind and escapes into theoria, it 
is likely to lead practical action astray. 
I am not trying to ascribe to Habermas an untenable view that feelings 
and emotions are inherently irrational and need to be suppressed in favor 
of pure reason. He is also right when he says that some of our sentiments 
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are systematically distorted and have to be subjected to therapeutic cri- 
tique. My point is rather that TCA leaves out from its purview the 
noncognitive forms of intelligence irreducible to verbal intellect, what 
pragmatists call "embodied" or "concrete reasonableness" (Rochberg- 
Halton 1986; Alexander 1987). Reasonableness is minding embedded in 
practical activity and embodied in emotionally charged situations. It does 
not scoff at common sense or Verstand, and it resists Vernunft's imperious 
tendency to subordinate other faculties to its dictate. Knowledge unin- 
formed by feelings and stripped of emotive elements can be rational 
without being reasonable; it achieves certainty by discarding insight from 
the senses in favor of the rationales laid out by the intellect. Yet, even 
though both noncognitive experience and speculative thought partake in 
the world, the former is embedded in nature more immediately, yielding 
instant information about the changing situation through its affective 
states vital to the organism: "Experience is of as well as in nature. [It] 
reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an 
indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference" 
(Dewey [1929] 1958a, p. 4a). "The continuum which [sentiment] forms 
instead of being like that of reason merely cognitive, superficial, or sub- 
jective . . . penetrates through the whole being of the soul, and is objec- 
tive or to use a better word extant, and more than that is existent" (Peirce 
1976, p. xxi). Reason's access to the world, by contrast, is mediated by 
a feeling body, whose testimony certifies our validity claims. It is in the 
Platonic domain that reason reigns supreme, the domain where objects 
are not contaminated by impurities besetting the mundane realm and 
obey laws prescribed by pure reason. As long as reason stays within 
this rarefied chamber, it can abstract from concrete situation and take a 
profitable leave of one's emotional investments, but as soon as knowers 
step into the world of uncertainty, they inexorably fall back on an auxil- 
iary intelligence about things themselves that only noncognitive faculties 
can gather. Human intelligence is emotional just as emotions are intelli- 
gent, and this is so because we live in the world of indeterminacy that 
no rational faculty and theoretical rigor can expunge. 
Determinate Being versus Indeterminate Reality 
The residual place Habermas assigns to body and noncognitive experi- 
ence is consistent with a rationalist ontology. This ontology paints an 
overdeterminate picture of the universe as factual, internally structured, 
determined prior to the knower's engagement in it, and marked by "the 
categorical distinctions between the objective, social, and subjective 
worlds" (Habermas 1987b, p. 159). The early and relatively undifferenti- 
ated worldviews (those centered on mythology or religion) tend to blur the 
256 
This content downloaded from 131.216.164.48 on Tue, 7 May 2013 17:09:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Critical Theory 
distinctions between these three worlds and the validity claims peculiar 
to each. Knowledge appears in such worldviews as a mixture of the 
objective and the subjective, the particular and the general, the cog- 
nitive and the emotional, with no sharp line drawn between verifiable 
facts, culturally sanctioned dogma, and patently idiosyncratic claims. 
The modern-scientific-outlook allows one to separate verifiable facts 
from commonly held illusions and makes possible, at least in principle, 
the rational adjudication of conflicts in the normative sphere. Purified by 
proper method from unwarranted preconceptions, ideological obfusca- 
tions, and personal biases, public discourse yields a rationally motivated 
consensus about facts in our shared universe and points to the most 
rational course of action. 
Twentieth-century pragmatist ontology has come to us bearing differ- 
ent labels-"pluralism," "perspectivism," "objective relativism," and 
more recently "new fuzziness" (Rorty 1989, p. 51). Yet its basic insight is 
essentially the same: "Uncertainty does not belong simply to the values, it 
belongs to the facts as well" (Mead, n.d., b8, f i).7 "Any view which 
holds that man is a part of nature, not outside it," according to Dewey 
(1946, p. 351), "will certainly hold that indeterminacy in human experi- 
ence, once experience is taken in the objective sense of interacting behav- 
ior and not as a private conceit added on to something totally alien to it, 
is evidence of some corresponding indeterminateness in the process of 
nature within which man exists (acts) and out of which he arose." The 
pragmatist ontology pictures a universe vastly different from the one 
envisioned by classical rationalism, "a universe which is not all closed 
and settled, which is still in some respects indeterminate and in the 
making, . . . an open universe in which uncertainty, choice, hypotheses, 
novelties and possibilities are naturalized" (Dewey [1927] 1950c, p. 52). 
Such a universe is full of uncertain outcomes that defy our best efforts 
to reduce chaotic processes to a theoretical scheme in which all effects 
have identifiable causes and our destiny submits to rational manipula- 
tion. Pragmatist philosophy "gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in 
which no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene" (James 
[1897] 1956, p. 177). "Man lives in a world of surmise, of mystery, of 
uncertainties," admonishes Dewey (1958b, p. 198), "'Reasoning' must 
fail man." Again, it is easy to misconstrue these musings as a sign of 
anti-intellectualism, but the point is not that rational knowledge is impos- 
sible or useless, but that rationalists underestimate the contingency en- 
7Mead (n.d.) refers to the George H. Mead papers gathered in the Special Collections 
Department of the Joseph Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago. The letters 
b and f followed by a number indicate the box and folder, respectively, in which a 
particular document is located. 
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demic to the world, and they vastly exaggerate reason's capacity to mar- 
shal it as an orderly flow of objective being. 
What is to be stressed here is that we are dealing not with residual 
indeterminacy reflecting the limits of our current knowledge but with 
"objective uncertainty" and "indeterminate reality," the emergent uni- 
verse in which "deliberation and choice are determining factors" (Dewey 
1950b, p. 310). It is up to concrete reasoning-always an interest-bound, 
socially anchored, situationally specific undertaking-to lift the world 
from its natural state of indeterminacy and turn it into a meaningful, 
manageable, semiorderly whole. This objective whole maintains its pre- 
dictable properties insofar as we sustain our interest in it, as long as our 
determined collective efforts last. Each time we pass judgment on the 
situation at hand-literally terminate indeterminacy-we bring out some 
of its potentialities and render obscure its other possible determinations. 
An act of doing justice, which a theoretical, normative, or aesthetic judg- 
ment aspires to be, is thus inevitably an act of doing violence. Just as it 
opens one horizon of meaning it closes an indefinite number of alternative 
determinations (fittingly, "to terminate" means to extinguish, to put an 
end to, as well as to bring into focus, to frame in definite terms). What- 
ever determinacy we encounter in the world is, consequently, of our own 
making. We terminate indeterminacy in deed and in situ, using terms 
supplied by a community, and we do so as participant-observers who are 
part and parcel of the situation we seek to comprehend: "If there were 
no human beings (or comparable sentient creatures) there would be no 
situations in nature" (Gouinlock 1972, p. 8). The knower's embed- 
dedness in the world as a participant-observer has far-reaching epistemo- 
logical implications, none more important than this: validity claims about 
the world of uncertainty cannot be settled through argument in the propo- 
sitional discourse; the redemption of validity claims is a pragmatic en- 
deavor accomplished via social intercourse. 
Discursive Validity versus Pragmatic Certainty 
One of the pillars on which Habermas founded TCA is his "consensus 
theory of truth" (Habermas 1973, p. 19; 1984, pp. 8-42). We can speak 
more broadly about the discursive theory of validation, for all validity 
claims, including rightness and sincerity, are at issue. This theory stipu- 
lates that validity claims must be redeemed through arguments and that 
''communicative actors can achieve an understanding only by way of 
taking yes/no positions on criticizable validity claims" (Habermas 1984, 
p. 70). If "reasons that force us to take a rationally motivated position 
of yes or no" (Habermas 1985, pp. 194-95) failed to produce a consensus, 
a communicative action has missed its stated end; such failure signifies 
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that the participants lacked candor to carry out communicative action to 
its rational conclusion. One notable exception allowed by discursive the- 
ory of validation involves aesthetic discourse: "The claims to sincerity 
connected with expressive utterance is [sic] not such that it could be 
directly redeemed through argument as can truth or rightness claims.... 
The sincerity of expressions cannot be grounded but only shown; insincer- 
ity can be revealed by the lack of consistency between an utterance and 
the past or future actions internally connected with it" (Habermas 1984, 
p. 41). No extradiscursive means are allowed into theoretical and norma- 
tive discourses, where participants are compelled toward a rational con- 
sensus by methodically advancing well-formed propositions, by clarifying 
the internal logic of the argument, and by adjudicating conflicts through 
theoretical means. 
While TCA attends to discursive validity vouchsafed through proposi- 
tional formal logic, pragmatist theory focuses on "pragmatic certainty" 
(Rosenthal 1986, p. 59), which requires joined action and logistical rea- 
soning as much as argumentative skills. Discursive validation is part of 
a larger human practice where all ideational objects have their roots. 
There are no objects to perceive, to value, to abstract from, according 
to pragmatists, until there has been the "full completion of the act" or 
"consummation" (Mead 1938, p. 23). The world that lends itself to 
objective judgment is already an objectified world, reality transformed 
by our perception, cognition, and collective action, and to say that our 
thought is true to this world makes as much sense as to say that this 
world is true to our preconceptions about it. Either way, to be certain 
about our claims, we have to engage in collective transformative action. 
Pragmatists are at one with Marx on this: "The question whether objec- 
tive truth is an attribute of human thought-is not a theoretical but a 
practical question" (Marx [1846] 1963, p. 197). That is to say, there is 
more to redeeming truth claims than finding good reasons and building 
consensus about them. We need to be certain that the predicated identity 
between knowledge and reality can be actually redeemed, and that means 
immersing oneself in the situation, joining in a collective act, and car- 
rying it to a completion. 
A word of caution against setting up a false dichotomy between practi- 
cally reached certainty and communicatively established consensus is 
called for: one is meaningless without the other. The pragmatist critique 
presented here aims at redressing the balance. Rational arguments have 
been advanced in favor of releasing mentally ill patients who pose no 
immediate threat to themselves and to the public, and a solid public 
consensus was built around this issue in the 1960s. Yet this perfectly 
rational policy turned out to be a failure, as the logistics of providing for 
the ex-patients' needs via neighborhood communities proved to be much 
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too formidable for the effective delivery of noninstitutional care. The 
moral here is that we cannot always redeem substantive claims-we 
cannot be certain about their pragmatic merit-in advance of staking 
our action on their truthfulness or, for that matter, justness and sincerity 
(the premise equally applies to theoretical, normative, and aesthetic dis- 
courses). The pertinent question for pragmatists is not whether a proposi- 
tion is true according to some intrinsic rationality, but whether the real 
situation can be shaped according to a stated rationale. To find out how 
consensually validated terms mesh with reality, we have to move beyond 
symbolic and performative action; we must try to terminate extant inde- 
terminacy (or reterminate established determinacy) through practical so- 
cial intercourse. Truth is no longer grasped here in the rationalist manner 
as adequatio intellectus et rei but instead is pragmatically conceived as 
a practically accomplished unity of knowledge and reality. In this reckon- 
ing, it makes as much sense to inquire whether an action-transformed 
situation is true to our concepts as to ask whether our propositions corre- 
spond to objective reality. To accomplish pragmatically the predicated 
unity of knowledge and reality, the knower has to engage in what interac- 
tionists call "joint action" (Blumer 1969, p. 17). This region, situated on 
the intersection between labor and discourse, has no conceptual footing in 
TCA. And yet, this is a domain of the utmost importance, the realm of 
everyday living and minding together where theoretical, normative, and 
aesthetic discourses merge into one, where humans feel, think, and trans- 
act at the same time, and where a different logic is called upon to help 
us master everyday contingencies.8 The pragmatist logic is the logic in 
use; it stipulates that reality does not always lend itself squarely to yes/ 
no judgments and allows practical knowers to say "perhaps," "it de- 
pends," "who knows," and to use other indeterminate truth values that 
help us handle situational indeterminacy. The dilemma that so struck 
William James ([1909] 1967, pp. 208, 207)-"either [I] give up my intel- 
lectualistic logic, the logic of identity . . . or, finally, face the fact that 
life is logically irrational"-is familiar to every practical knower who 
had to contend with everyday indeterminacy in the pluralistic universe 
and who could conclude, with James, that "logic being the lesser thing, 
the static incomplete abstraction, must succumb to reality, not reality to 
logic" (1967, p. 207). Binary logic favored by rationalist thought is re- 
placed in pragmatism by the logic in use, also known as the logic of 
inquiry or the logic of situation. This pragmatist logic signals a break 
8 Various attempts have been made to conceptualize this intermediate space. Durk- 
heim searched for it in the intraprofessional type interactions, as did Parsons, and 
Peter Burger detected it in the realm of communal, familial interactions. See David 
Sciulli (1988, 1992) for an overview of the issues involved. 
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with "the rationalism's disdain for the particular, the personal, and the 
unwholesome" (James 1967, p. 309). It stipulates that judgment is "in" 
this world as much as it is "about" it, that "the proposition is itself a 
factor in the completion of the situation" (Dewey 1916b, p. 338), and it 
attends to "the transformation of an indeterminate unsettled situation 
into a determinate unified existential situation" (Dewey 1938, p. 296). 
The quest for rational truth and moral rightness is supplanted here by 
the quest for warranted assertability and practical certainty. Whereas 
the former depends on discursive validation and "comparing ready-made 
ideas with ready-made facts," the latter requires pragmatic inquiry and 
presumes that "both idea and 'facts' are flexible, and verification is the 
process of mutual adjustment, of organic interaction" (Dewey [1890] 
1969, p. 87). The quest for pragmatic certainty sensitizes the knower 
to fuzzy things, multiple realities, semichaotic systems, and it favors 
participant-observation as a practical way to fathom objective uncer- 
tainty. The radically pragmatic epistemological stance also entails clear 
ethical and political implications: it counsels tolerance to ambiguity, calls 
for personal responsibility, and encourages rationally motivated dissent. 
Rational Consensus versus Reasonable Dissent 
My next criticism concerns TCA's emphasis on consensus and its disre- 
gard for the constructive properties of dissent. On several occasions, 
Habermas (1979, pp. 1, 92) qualifies as "normal" situations and com- 
munications that are "largely conflict free." Consensus appears to be 
communication's raison d'etre. This is certainly true in an ideal speech 
situation where "all participants pursue illocutionary aims without reser- 
vation in order to arrive at an agreement that will provide the basis 
for a consensual coordination of individually pursued plans of action" 
(Habermas 1984, pp. 295-96). The broader the consensus, the greater 
the rationality. Anything that falls short of universal consensus is, on 
this premise, less than fully rational. Discourse ethics demands that those 
partaking in rational discourse should be motivated by the "intention 
of convincing a universal audience and gaining general assent for an 
utterance" (Habermas 1984, p. 26). Anybody who refuses to join in an 
emerging rational consensus, spurns communicatively certified reasons, 
or stops short of trying to convince all other participants of the merit of 
one's proposition violates the norms of discourse ethics. The spirit of 
communicative action militates against accepting conflict as a normal 
part of the communication process and dissensus as a rational product 
of action aimed at reaching understanding. "To be sure," Habermas 
(1985, p. 194) admits, "it is also a characteristic of modernity that we 
have grown accustomed to living with dissent in the realm of questions 
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that admit of 'truth'; we simply put controversial validity claims to one 
side 'for the time being."' Dissent about truth claims, in other words, 
is more an expediency than a principled stance in a communicatively 
shaped situation; in the long enough run, dissent must yield to rational 
consensus. 
Pragmatist ontology and epistemology suggest a different approach, 
one that accentuates the limits of theoretically grounded consensus and 
highlights the productive properties of dissent. "Real possibilities, real 
indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catas- 
trophes, and escapes, a real God and a real moral life, just as common 
sense conceives these things, may remain in [a radically pragmatic] em- 
piricism which that philosophy gives up an attempt either to 'overcome' 
or to reinterpret in monistic form" (James 1956, p. ix). The universe so 
conceived belies TCA's consensual bias. The inexhaustible possibilities 
of being hidden in its depths can hardly be fathomed through a thin-gruel 
theoretical consensus. It is as if we choose to understand Bach by reading 
the music sheets rather than by listening to his fugues. Communication 
at the level of formal notation is what Habermas seems to propose in 
order to ferret out the communication's rational content. Yet the score 
is not the only thing that counts in music; each recital offers a dissenting 
yet valid interpretation or rather improvisation (just think about the 
vastly different communication that takes place when Vladimir Horo- 
witz, Glenn Gould, Bella Davidovich, or the Modern Jazz Quartet inter- 
prets Bach). The pluralistic universe envisioned by pragmatists encour- 
ages dissent, warrants a wide margin of uncertainty, and invites caution 
toward policies based on purely theoretical calculations. 
Habermas's universal pragmatics leaves hardly any room for the hon- 
est difference of opinion. A disagreement that refuses to go away is taken 
here as a sign of a failure, and a moral one at that: it hints at a strategic 
motif at work and/or betrays a weak communicative resolve. By ground- 
ing a rational consensus in sound reasons, Habermas also finds himself 
saddled by an awkward implication that whosoever refuses to abide by 
the communicatively established consensus is, by definition, less than 
fully rational. In the pragmatist reckoning, there is no necessary relation- 
ship between procedural rationality and substantive consensus. Public 
discourse is as much about consensus building as it is about fostering 
dissent. In pragmatist theory, by contrast, dissensus and consensus are 
accorded an equally prominent theoretical role. The proper function 
of communicatively achieved consensus is to designate reasons sound 
enough to merit pragmatic validation. A freely achieved consensus is 
usually partial, imperfect, provisional; it does not obviate the need for 
conflict, it legitimizes conflict as an inalienable part of rational discourse. 
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Nor does communicative action merely tolerate dissent, it encourages 
dissent as vital to the community's well-being. Dissent is the first sign 
that communication was uncoerced and that participants expressed them- 
selves freely. It is in the countries where the speech situation is far from 
ideal that consensus is commonly forged and dissent becomes exceptional. 
What makes the dissenting attitude rational is the realization that various 
lines of argumentation can be meritorious, that the situation lends itself 
to more than one adjudication, that the attendant risks and uncertainties 
are great, and that the widest possible consensus is bound to break down 
the moment we set out to implement it. 
All this should not be taken to mean that discursive consensus has no 
practical value. I am not trying to attribute to Habermas an untenable 
position that dissent does not matter. It is also true that some basic 
ground rules must be agreed upon before we can dissent in a meaningful 
and productive manner. Still, I feel that Habermas does not make nearly 
enough of rationally motivated dissensus, nor does he explore the practi- 
cal consequences of dissent with which we must square off once we have 
agreed to disagree. Rational consensus, like a generally accepted moral 
rule, is but "a tool for analyzing a specific situation, the right or wrong 
being determined by the situation in its entirety, and not by the rule as 
such" (Dewey and Tufts [1908] 1976, p. 302). We cannot play chess 
without agreeing on rules, nor drive a car without knowing traffic signs, 
nor live in a community without following social conventions, yet we 
routinely disagree about the best chess move, the safest response to an 
emergency, or a just solution to a social problem, and the more compli- 
cated the situation, the more room there is for the honest difference of 
opinion. This goes not only for common folks unschooled in hermeneutics 
but also for well-seasoned experts (think about split decisions handed 
down by the U.S. Supreme Court). Being at odds with oneself, being of 
two (or more) minds on a given issue, is a distinctly human and immi- 
nently rational sentiment. We call it "ambivalence," and we find it 
especially handy in dealing with the muddled situations that surround us 
on all fronts, most signally moral situations, which rarely submit to gen- 
eral principles. "Every moral situation is a unique situation," pragma- 
tists contend (Dewey [1920] 1950a, pp. 132-33): "The primary signifi- 
cance of the unique and morally ultimate character of the concrete 
situation is to transfer the weight and burden of morality to intelligence." 
The key word here is "intelligence"-the pragmatist name for reason 
firmly embedded in a concrete situation, fully in touch with its feelings, 
and mindful of the uncertainties and risks involved. Such embodied rea- 
son has a modern temper that befits democracy, and the "gospel of 
uncertainty" (Kloppenberg 1986, p. 413) it brings into the project of 
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modernity offers an important corrective to the emancipatory agenda 
championed by classical and contemporary critical theory. 
Transcendental Democracy versus Democratic Transcendence 
Although the index for Habermas's monumental study does not mention 
the term, TCA is very much a treatise on democracy or rather a critical 
examination of its perversion in modern society. According to Habermas, 
whose views on the subject go back to 1962 and his Habilitationsschrift 
(1989), the capitalist welfare state subverts the substance of the demo- 
cratic process through bureaucratic procedures and mediatized com- 
munications which, on the one hand, bring more people into the pub- 
lic sphere than any other political system, but on the other, emasculate 
that sphere by whittling down its participatory substance. Late capitalist 
society stifles "the possibilities for spontaneous opinion formation and 
discursive will-formation through a segmentation of the voter's role, 
through the competition of leadership elites, through vertical opinion 
formation in bureaucratically encrusted party apparatuses, through auto- 
nomized parliamentary bodies, through powerful communication net- 
works, and the like" (Habermas 1987b, p. 365). Communicative action 
is bound to be distorted under these quasi-democratic conditions, and a 
manufactured consensus is likely to be false as long as capitalist market 
imperatives constrict various social strata's access to and participation 
in public affairs. Characteristically, Habermas does not cite the incurably 
formalistic logic of rational administration that critical theorists have 
singled out as the culprit. The gist of the problem, for Habermas, is the 
disuse, misuse, and abuse that the public sphere has fallen into under 
certain historical conditions. He believes that these conditions can be 
rectified and ameliorated through critical inquiry into our communicative 
practices. Such inquiry falls within the domain of "transcendental her- 
meneutics" or "transcendental pragmatics" (Habermas 1979, p. 23), 
which offer "a reconstructive analysis oriented to general and unavoid- 
able presuppositions" and reveal "structures of mutual understanding 
that are found in the intuitive knowledge of competent members of mod- 
ern societies" (Habermas 1987b, p. 383). Now, the crucial point in the 
whole argument is that the a priori conditions for reaching understanding 
explicated by transcendental (or universal, as Habermas now prefers to 
call it) pragmatics are fundamentally the same as the conditions for 
achieving a democratic society. This is already evident in the rational 
procedures guiding communicative action. These procedures, encoded in 
the ideal speech situation, can be read as prescriptions for substantive 
democracy or "democratic form of decision-making, namely: rationaliz- 
ing decisions in such a way that they can be made dependent on a consen- 
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sus arrived at through discussions free from domination" (Habermas 
1970).9 Notice that substantively rational decisions cannot depend on 
opinion polling, electioneering, and vote counting because such mecha- 
nisms of formal representation transfer individual's discursive rights to 
others and succeed chiefly in "a cleansing of political participation from 
any participatory content" (Habermas 1987b, p. 350). Formally demo- 
cratic decisions and collective actions based on them are marred by non- 
discursiveness and thus are communicatively flawed, which is why "ma- 
jority decisions are held [in TCA] to be only a substitute for the 
uncompelled consensus that would finally result if discussion did not 
always have to be broken off owing to the need of a decision" (Habermas 
1970, p. 7). A communicatively sound social order must be based on a 
rationally motivated, freely achieved universal consensus, which simulta- 
neously satisfies the transcendental conditions for successful communica- 
tive action and for a genuinely democratic society. 
There is much in the above argument that dovetails with, if not derives 
from, pragmatism. Pragmatists acknowledge that modern societies pro- 
duce systemic consequences and have functional implications detrimental 
to the participatory ideal. Long before Habermas they thought that "dis- 
content with democracy as it operates under conditions of exploitation 
by special interests has justification" and warned that "the functional 
aspect is contradictory to the ends of democracy" as long as "there is 
the opportunity for exploitation of the individual" (Dewey 1946, p. 133; 
Mead 1934, pp. 288-89). Since the onset of the Progressive Era, pragma- 
tists stressed that "no government by experts in which the masses do not 
have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything 
but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few" (Dewey [1927] 
1954, p. 208). Habermas's vision of a communicatively sound social order 
is also adumbrated in pragmatism, which treats democracy as a form of 
communication, "a name for a free and enriching communion" (Dewey 
1954, p. 184), and trusts humans to resolve their differences by dis- 
covering common goods. "Reason is then a medium within which values 
may be brought into comparisons with each other, in abstraction from 
the situations," reads a particularly Habermasian passage in Mead 
([1930] 1964, p. 406), "and within this impartial medium it becomes 
possible to reconstruct values and our conduct growing out of them." In 
spite of these instructive continuities, there are several points on which 
Habermas and pragmatists diverge. 
9 The term substantive democracy is used here in a broad sense that is consistent with 
Habermas's vision of a communicatively sound democratic system that is rich in 
participatory content and, as such, contrasts with the notion of formal democracy, in 
which individuals are deprived of a meaningful opportunity to engage in communica- 
tive action. 
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Pragmatists are not satisifed with discursive elucidation of common 
values and universal principles; "the universe of discourse," they are 
likely to stress (Mead, n.d., b8, f8), "is rather the universe of 
intercourse"-the latter brings to a test the precepts furnished by the 
former. "The ethical problem is always a specific one," says Mead (1964, 
p. 405), "the problem itself defines the values." "Especially does the 
pragmatist deny that the solution of our problems can be found in any 
vision given on the mount or prearranged order of society" (Mead, n.d., 
Addenda, b3, f 7). Universal pragmatics does not exactly envision a prear- 
ranged order, but its procedural strictures are too general, too far re- 
moved from messy things out there to help us navigate in the world 
of uncertainty. The theory of communicative action goads us toward 
consensus and demands the unequivocal commitment to certain policies 
even before we have a chance to find out whether they pass muster 
in life. Only immersion into the practical world, with all its hazards, 
confusions, and unforeseen developments, can clarify what a given con- 
sensus means, which reality it engenders. Habermas (1973, p. 19) misses 
this point when he disparages the pragmatist rush to action and praises 
the virtues of discursive situations "which transcend the compulsions of 
action." Pragmatists do not deny reason its proper rights-they want 
to subject its pronouncements to pragmatic test. Truth is a practically 
accomplished unity of knowledge and reality, and that means tinkering 
with things and events to make sure they match our theoretical calcula- 
tions. In the process, we are certain to run into unforeseen circumstances, 
unanticipated consequences, and unyielding particulars, which need to 
be transcended in situ and not just in theoria. As chaos theory tells us, 
minor changes in one variable can have vast ramifications for a system 
as a whole. This applies to human societies as well, which evolve pat- 
terned ways of handling indeterminacy. 
If society is a semiordered chaos routinely generating unanticipated 
consequences, as pragmatism implies, then democracy is a historically 
specific mode of managing uncertainty. "Democracy expects the unex- 
pected" (Betz 1974, p. 216) and "recognizes that uncertainty is inevitable 
and then turns it to positive account" (Dewey and Childs 1933, p. 309; 
see also Przeworski 1986). Democratic systems thrive on uncertainty; 
they rely on market, competition, ad hocing, and muddling through 
as necessary, even if distortion-prone, mechanisms for handling a large 
number of incalculable variables. By the same token, democratic poli- 
ties promote conflicting life-forms, open up public discourse for an ever- 
widening range of participants, and maximize the public's role in defining 
the terms in which indeterminacy can be legitimately terminated. Con- 
trariwise, nondemocratic polities seek to expunge uncertainty through 
exhaustive planning, centralized control over terminological practices, 
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and punitive actions against dissenters who favor alternative terminolog- 
ies. The less democratic the system, the more it fears discord and values 
consensus and the more likely it is to favor a monopoly on the terminolog- 
ical means of production of social reality as objective and meaningful. 
This is why pragmatists do not accept consensus, however discursively 
achieved, as the highest democratic value. The pluralistic universe pre- 
supposed by pragmatist thought precludes any one standpoint from being 
anointed as unassailably true, good, and authentic. If any claim merits 
such honorific title, it is the agreement to disagree, without which a 
democratic process is indeed unthinkable. Democratic institutions give 
extra room for the honest difference of opinion, maximize opportunities 
for dissent, not just for consensus, and protect minorities from aspersions 
the majority is apt to cast on their rationality. Dissenting insights may 
be rejected by the community, and for good reasons, yet they are to be 
safeguarded because they hint at the unrealized potentialities of being. 
To be sure, democratic societies fall short of their professed ideal of the 
unlimited access to public discourse and allow assorted elites an undue 
influence over public affairs, but this is a poor reason to discount nondis- 
cursive means in politics. When we vote, select representatives, delegate 
authority to experts, and vest power in the executive branch, we admit- 
tedly move away from democratic discursiveness and thereby open the 
door for the kind of distortions Habermas so eloquently decries. But 
without these formal means we could not break the discursive impasse 
or react efficiently to situations that require prompt action. If we take 
discourse ethics seriously, we should keep on arguing until a universal 
consensus has emerged, lest our good faith efforts are put into question. 
Yet such demands are unrealistic. They are certain to run afoul the hung 
jury predicament and founder on the kind of problems Rousseau faced 
when he tried to reconcile volonte general and volonte de tous in his 
proposal for direct democracy (see Schumpeter 1950, pp. 235-68; Van 
den Berg 1990, p. 163). From the pragmatist standpoint, the fact that 
participants resort to a show of hands and settle for a less than universal 
consensus is no affront to reason. Majority decision serves as a demo- 
cratic, if formal, device for reaching a working consensus about conflict- 
ing rationalities vying for practical validation. To test a rationality means 
not only going beyond communication but also assuming responsibility 
for our action-not just discursive action but also a joint act, which has 
practical consequences and which presupposes a different type of ethics 
than the ethics of discourse. 
The pragmatic ethics (I shall call it the "ethics of uncertainty") urge 
close attention to the "correlation between the means used and the conse- 
quences that follow" (Dewey 1946, p. 138). Attention to consequences 
produced by our conduct is mandatory because different lines of action 
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incur varied risks and beget unpredictable, irreversible outcomes. Ratio- 
nal people disagreed as to whether we should have relied on economic 
sanctions to force Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, but once the decision 
was made to forge ahead with the military option, consequences befell 
the innocent and the guilty alike. The Lithuanian government's bid for 
independence was well grounded in "good reasons," yet it produced a 
bloody backlash few people were able to foresee. No matter how discur- 
sively validated a policy is, responsibility for the consequences should 
be borne by the individual. The ethics of democracy are the ethics of 
responsibility, and, as such, they contrast with the ethics of good faith 
and ultimate ends, which seek to suppress uncertainty and narrow the 
scope for individual judgment. 
It would be unfair to say that Habermas somehow endorses the ethics 
of ultimate ends-his writings on German politics belie any such accusa- 
tion. Nor does he subscribe to the utopian vision of Jacobin democracy 
that imposes its will on the unwilling subjects. And yet in its implications, 
Habermas's ethics are not free from some of the difficulties faced by the 
moral systems based on good faith and end-rational grounding. Discur- 
sive ethics plead for a domination-free life, forswear force other than the 
force of reason, and aim at substantive democracy, yet the results are 
likely to be ironic. Reason cannot escape domination as long as it seeks 
to impose on the world an overarching rationality in the face of the ample 
evidence that things themselves do not suffer theory gladly and are sure 
to spoil our best-faith efforts. A consensus compelled by no other force 
than that of good reasons is still a forced consensus if it chains the individ- 
ual to a predetermined rationale, situational contingencies notwithstand- 
ing. And transcendental democracy is likely to remain a utopian trap if 
it does not make room for personal responsibility. By digging the commu- 
nicative foundations of a rational social order, Habermas gave the 
critical-theoretic program a much-needed lift, yet his communicatively 
grounded reason still needs to be enlightened to fulfil its emancipatory 
promise. It needs to be guarded against its own intolerance and maxi- 
malism. It needs ambivalence, common sense, compassion-the virtues 
of intelligence that pragmatists consider central to democratic transcen- 
dence and sane existence in the world of uncertainty. 
Rational Society versus Sane Community 
Habermas shares with classical critical theory its predilection for "de- 
mocratization, decentralization and socialist positions," yet his agenda 
is different from the one implicit in the Frankfurt school, for he respects 
liberalism, appeals directly to the public, and "demands a remoralization 
of politics" (Habermas 1986, p. 71). All systemic distortions, according 
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to TCA, are prefigured in the communicative domain. If social organiza- 
tion has turned oppressive and politics have collapsed into administra- 
tion, it is because our transactions have grown communicatively irratio- 
nal. With the community as a whole losing control over society's steering 
mechanisms, special interests seize the opportunity to assert their partic- 
ularistic rationalities under various ideological covers. Repackaged for 
mass consumption, these (ir)rationalities are translated back onto the 
individual plane. Here, through the mechanisms of consumption and 
socialization, they are bred into actors' bones, producing distorted needs 
and mentalities that, in turn, help reproduce impersonal bureaucracies 
and oppressive institutions. The system has uncoupled itself from the 
private sphere; it has stripped humans of their dignity, usurped their 
autonomy, perverted their needs-it has colonized the life world. To 
reclaim control over the system, the community must cut bureaucracy 
down to size, symbolically as well as literally, and recreate the conditions 
somewhat akin to the intellectual salons of the Enlightenment, where 
men and women gathered to make sense together and to furnish intellec- 
tual insights that would later be felt throughout society. The task for our 
time is to open the political forum to the public at large, refocus attention 
on communicative action, and radically upgrade the quality of the pro- 
cesses aimed at reaching understanding: "The reevaluation of the partic- 
ular, the natural, the provincial, of social spaces that are small enough 
to be familiar, of decentralized forms of commerce and differentiated 
public sphere-all this is meant to foster the revitalization of possibilities 
for expression and communication that have been buried alive" (Ha- 
bermas 1987b, p. 395). The communicative sphere must be freed from 
distortions, and that means taking seriously our assertions about facts, 
becoming reflexive about the normative bonds that we forge through our 
performative actions, making a personal commitment to be sincere. We 
have to learn to speak to ourselves and others in the voice of reason. 
Herein lies hope for "the possibility of settling our disagreements by 
adducing reasons," of releasing the "emancipatory potential built into 
communication structures themselves" and achieving a communicatively 
"rational society" (Habermas 1987b, pp. 74, 390). 
Once again, we can see how well Habermas's "communicative social- 
ism" (O'Neill 1985, p. 59) fits in with the pragmatist agenda and how 
much his specific program veers away from it. Pragmatists agree with 
Habermas that bureaucratized social systems should be scaled down and 
made accountable to the public. "Democracy must begin at home, and 
its home is the neighborly community" (Dewey 1954, p. 213). Like Ha- 
bermas, pragmatists believe in the "passing of functions which are sup- 
posed to inhere in the government into activities that belong to the com- 
munity" (Mead 1899, p. 369). "The most concrete and fully realized 
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society is not that which is presented in institutions as such," contends 
Mead ([1915] 1964, pp. 166-67), "but [in] the readjustments of personal 
interests that have come into conflict and which take place outside of 
court, in the change of social attitude that is not dependent upon an act 
of legislature." But look at the values pragmatists praise in the communi- 
catively shaped order: "The community values of friendship, of passion, 
of parenthood, of amusement, of beauty, of social solidarity in its unnum- 
bered forms" (Mead 1964, p. 311). This is not exactly the list you find 
in TCA. The two perspectives share broad objectives but differ in sig- 
nificant details. 
Habermas wants to clear communications from inarticulate senti- 
ments, private interests, logical inconsistencies, and similar distortions 
as inimical to reason. Pragmatists find these essential to keeping one's 
sanity amidst the semichaotic order that surrounds us in everyday life. 
Pure reason has always looked with suspicion at passion and sentiment, 
but it has never succeeded in purging itself from their invidious touch. 
Reason has shown itself to be intolerant of ambiguity, contemptuous of 
common sense, disdainful of compromise, proud of its intellectual ma- 
chismo in dealing with particulars, and arrogantly dismissive of its own 
blunderings in the practical domain. History is filled with records of 
human enterprises bearing reason's seal of approval and stoking nothing 
but bitter ironies: revolutions that abuse human rights in the name of 
humanity; laissez-faire liberalism that spawns monopolies under the ban- 
ner of free trade; centralized economies that excel in producing shortages 
under the aegis of the plan; welfare programs that create a permanent 
underclass under the pretext of giving the underprivileged a fair 
chance-the list goes on and on. Habermas (1987a, p. 310) has a point 
when he sees the problem "not as an excess but as a deficit of rational- 
ity," but then he may be too kind to pure reason. He is certainly a bit 
disingenuous in his critique of "Western 'logocentrism"' given his own 
failure to acknowledge intelligence native to instinct and common sense. 
Deracinated affect is a dangerous thing, but reason that plugs its ears to 
elude the siren voices of sentiment runs equally great risks. Cultures that 
have mindlessly entrusted themselves to the guidance of pure reason and 
"undercut instinct, common sense, and the reasonableness of sentiment" 
have insured their own "imminent extinction at the hands of unhinged 
reason" (Rockberg-Halton 1986, p. 144). "Motivation through 'good 
reasons"' (Habermas 1979, p. 200) does not forestall the emergence of 
the bureaucratic "megamachine" that devours its creators (Mumford 
1967). Pushing body, instinct, and sentiment to the life world's periphery 
does not make culture more humane (Alexander 1987). And as Dewey 
acutely sensed, abstract thought that shuns the senses and ignores the 
ordinary betrays its insensitivity in practical affairs. 
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Men who devote themselves to thinking are likely to be unusually unthink- 
ing in some respects, as for example in immediate personal relationships. 
A man to whom exact scholarship is an absorbing pursuit may be more 
than ordinarily vague in ordinary matters. Humility and impartiality may 
be shown in a specialized field, and pettiness and arrogance in dealing with 
other persons. . . . "Reason" as a noun signifies a happy cooperation of a 
multitude of dispositions, such as sympathy, curiosity, cooperation, explo- 
ration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit-to follow things through- 
circumspection, to look about at the context, etc., etc. [Dewey 1950b, pp. 
198, 196] 
To guard against its own excesses, reason must be enlightened by 
feeling, edified by emotions, ennobled by desire. Above all, it must be 
sensitized to objective uncertainty. Coming to grips with the nondiscur- 
sive element in our experience not only helps safeguard reason from 
overindulging in abstractions but also opens the door to creativity and 
social reconstruction. Habermas appears to overlook this point when he 
commits himself to "the cognitivist position" that social problems can 
be solved within the domain of Verstandigung, strictly "by way of argu- 
mentation" (Habermas 1984, p. 19). For their part, pragmatists accentu- 
ate the role of intuitive impulses and appeal to artistic imagination as 
powerful tools for breaking the routines of experience, smashing barriers 
that separate groups, and generating fresh insights into troublesome so- 
cial issues (Dewey 1958b). "To the degree that we make the community 
in which we live different we all have what is essential to genius," 
explains Mead (1934, p. 218). Social creativity involves "those values 
which are found in the immediate attitude of the artist, the inventor, the 
scientist in his discovery, in general in the action of the 'I' which cannot 
be calculated and which involves a reconstruction of society, and so of the 
'me' which belongs to this society" (Mead 1934, p. 214). Social change is 
predicated here not just on the linguistically mediated "me" as it makes 
an appearance in discursive communication but on the instinctive, aes- 
thetic, unpremeditated "I" that bursts forth on the social scene and 
makes individual experience valuable to the community as a whole. 
Seen from this pragmatist angle, values appear inseparable from habit, 
instinct, and behavior; they are "valuations, habitualized acts of judg- 
ment rather than simply inert norms" (Rochberg-Halton 1986, p. 16). 
Social norms have to find their way into mind's noncognitive recesses 
and become suffused with emotions, transformed into habits, translated 
into routine judgments: "No social modification, slight or revolutionary 
can endure except as it enters into the action of a people through their 
desires and purposes" (Dewey and Childs 1933, p. 318). Humane com- 
munity is first and foremost an attitude shared by its members, a feeling 
like empathy or solidarity generalized to a point where it can inform 
social routines. Such nondiscursive communications endemic to commu- 
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nal being are not to be equated with diminished rationality. "Another 
meaning of 'rational' is, in fact, available. In this sense, the word means 
something like 'sane' or 'reasonable' rather than 'methodical.' It names 
a set of moral virtues: tolerance, respect for the opinion of those around 
one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion rather than force" 
(Rorty 1987, p. 40). 1 The last point hints at broadening communicative 
action to include rhetoric and suasion. Communicative, or rather commu- 
nal, actions need not be a zero-sum game, in which my being in the right 
means you are in the wrong. Communal living requires tolerance to 
contradictions, a state that TCA proscribes as "a sign of a more irrational 
conduct of life" (Habermas 1984, p. 61). Inconstancy and paradoxicality 
are endemic to the pluralistic universe, to the "big, buzzing confusion" 
that James discovered at the core of our being. This universe is composed 
of many verses and is shot through with competing perspectives. It allows 
reason to be scattered across disparate social niches; it makes it appear 
under jarring sexual, racial, ethnic, religious, cultural, and social guises; 
it does not demand that various life-forms be brought to a common 
denominator other than their proponents' commitment to coexist peace- 
fully, respect each other's uniqueness, and, where possible, draw on 
experience accumulated by others. As such, the pluralistic universe serves 
as the epitome of modernity pragmatically understood. 
The pragmatist outlook on modernity is closer to Simmel than to We- 
ber in that pragmatists find modernity distinguished by the expansion of 
the meaningful domain rather than its contraction, the unfettering of 
reason rather than its encagement, the revitalization of the life world 
rather than its disenchantment. The pluralistic universe does present 
the modern individual with the mind-boggling question of how to wade 
through jangling possibilities and keep one's sanity intact, yet pragma- 
tists see this situation less as a threat than a promise, insofar as it makes 
for a more meaningful life-as in life full of meaning (James 1956, pp. 
184-215). Today's pragmatists feel no compulsion to transform this semi- 
rational/semiabsurd world into a unified, logical, communicatively puri- 
fied, perfectly transparent block universe. To deal with modern life's 
chaotic cross-currents, they cultivate "irony," aim for "a de-theoreti- 
cized sense of community," and "take seriously Dewey's suggestion that 
the way to reenchant the world, to bring back what religion gave our 
forefathers, is to stick to the concrete" (Rorty 1985, p. 173). 
This modest program has several practical implications. For one thing, 
it suggests that not every evil and irrationality can be communicatively 
10 The pragmatist argument presented here overlaps with Gadamer's (1977) critique 
of Habermas for his indifference to the constructive, creative role that tradition plays 
in furthering communal values and living. 
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exorcised-some are endemic to human conditions and are best dealt 
with through joint narrative, communal grieving, shared muteness, 
bracketing, and glossing over. The pragmatist stance implies that univer- 
salizing the feeling of empathy and compassion is at least as important 
for sane existence as staking and redeeming validity claims. It calls for 
irony, humor, and ambivalence in handling many an absurdity of every- 
day life (Rorty [1989, p. 61] has a point when he calls Habermas a liberal 
without irony, for just as any other virtue, earnestness can be carried too 
far). Pragmatism also has a clear political dimension. It has been histori- 
cally aligned with progressive reforms aimed at systemic distortions that 
limit access to public discourse, the most insidious among these distor- 
tions being economic deprivation (Faris 1970; Deegan and Burger 1978; 
Diner 1980; Shalin 1988). At the same time, politics in the pragmatist 
key is rather ideologically atonal. Laissez-faire market, nationalized econ- 
omy, industrial growth, entitlement programs-these are but means to 
make our communal being more reasonable and sane, and if the results 
prove to be other than expected, pragmatists do not hesitate to acknowl- 
edge as much and to try other means. Critics have variously spurned this 
stance as conservative, radical, or opportunistic, but it defies any partisan 
label. 
Above all, pragmatists call for personal efforts in one's immediate 
community. In this respect, they follow Chekhov's counsel to avoid 
grandstanding and take up small deeds. That is to say, pragmatism chal- 
lenges us to start with ourselves, become reasonable with those closest 
to us, get out to a town meeting, PTA gathering, neighborhood associa- 
tion, and try to body forth a better community by talking, humoring, 
and cajoling its members into more reasonable ways. Once our efforts 
are met with success in our own abode, they are likely to be noticed and 
to fire up action elsewhere. As the Progressive Era pragmatist reformers 
had learned, social reconstruction starts in one community, envelops the 
city, moves to the state level, and then comes to the national legislature. 
The scheme does not fit each case and every country alike, but it suggests 
the kind of pragmatic, grass-root politics essential to democratic recon- 
struction. As long as we are willing to exert ourselves on behalf of our 
own community, pragmatists urge, we make the burden of living more 
bearable for all and keep alive the hope for emancipation through reason 
that critical theory has clung to since Rousseau. 
CONCLUSION 
In fairness to Habermas, it needs to be said that he foresees some of the 
objections raised in this essay. On several occasions, most copiously in 
his interviews, he intimated that he personally feels no urge to "bring a 
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satisfying order to chaos," that "there is nothing at all to which I have 
an unambivalent attitude," that rational society must be "as fallibilist 
and as open to self-correction as possible," that "every intervention in 
complex social structures has such unforeseeable consequences that pro- 
cesses of reform can only be defended as scrupulous processes of trial 
and error, under the careful control of those who have to bear their 
consequences" (Habermas 1986, pp. 126, 144, 187). Such statements 
qualify only as disclaimers, however, unless they are translated into theo- 
retical terms. In its present form, TCA provides no conceptual room for 
indeterminacy, has little use for nondiscursiveness, fails to appreciate the 
critical potential of sentiment, and does not square off discursive ethics 
with the need for personal responsibility. This is exactly why it is so 
important for Habermas and pragmatists to continue the search for com- 
mon ground. The cross-fertilization is likely to be beneficial for both 
sides. 
Pragmatists can learn from Habermas how to grasp in communication- 
theoretic terms systemic distortions that delimit access to public dis- 
course. The theory of communicative action offers valuable insights into 
the discursive bottlenecks that are created in an overloaded market sys- 
tem and that are prone to be exploited by particularistic interests. Ha- 
bermas has put his finger on an issue that is (or should be) central to the 
pragmatism-inspired social inquiry: the need to bridge the gap between 
action-theoretic and system-theoretic languages, between micro- and 
macrolevel analyses of social processes. Thus TCA provides fresh food 
for thought on how the movement toward formal representation in demo- 
cratic systems affects discursive will formation and what can be done to 
safeguard substantive democracy from the distortions it suffers when 
responsibility for public affairs is delegated to experts. Finally, Ha- 
bermas's analysis should help contemporary interactionists to reclaim the 
critical dimension of early pragmatism and refocus their inquiry on the 
structural conditions that hamper access to public discourse and under- 
mine the conditions for fruitful dissent. 
Habermas and Continental critical theorists have still more to learn 
from pragmatists. They have yet to acknowledge that reason uncaged is 
reason enlightened by sentiment, sensitized to uncertainty, steeped in 
ambivalence, willing to come to terms with common sense, humbled by 
the consciousness of the limits that nature sets to its ambitions. Emanci- 
pated from its bias against indeterminacy, reason is likely to concede that 
a consensus based on good reasons alone is a poor guide for action and 
that the ideal speech situation must include among its provisions an 
agreement to disagree. The question that critical thinkers might want to 
ponder is how to make our emotions intelligent and our intellect emotion- 
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ally sane. In sum, critical theory could greatly benefit from the pragmatist 
insights into embodied experience and objective uncertainty. 
These concerns are consistent with the broadly based trends in modern 
science, which is increasingly turning its attention toward chaos, uncer- 
tainty, fuzzy logic, emergent processes, dissipative structures, and other 
patently nonclassical subjects. The time has come to reconsider pragma- 
tist philosophy and interactionist sociology (which derived its inspiration 
from, though has not always been faithful to, pragmatism) with an eye 
to determining how both have presaged the developments in nonclassical 
science." The future agenda includes a sociology in the pragmatist key, 
the one that eschews both the irrationalism of Lebensphilosophie and the 
conservative proclivities of postmodernism-a critical social science of 
uncertainty that combines the commitment to emancipation with the 
readiness to meet head-on objective uncertainty. 
" See Shalin (1991) on pragmatism and symbolic interactionism as humanistic coun- 
terparts of nonclassical science. 
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